

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 041481

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INFO OCT-01 IO-10 AF-06 ARA-10 EA-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-02

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DRAFTED BY NEA/P:GFSHERMAN  
APPROVED BY NEA/P:GFSHERMAN  
S/PRS - MR. FUNSETH (INFO)  
H - MISS FOLGER (INFO)  
IO/P - MR. BLACHLY  
EUR/P - MR. JERABEK  
NEA/ARN - MR.KORN  
AF/P RUSSELL  
PM/MC - MR. FEMMIRELLA (INFO)  
PA/SAS - MR. JAMES(INFO)

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R 242153Z FEB 75  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY DACCA  
AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO  
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU  
AMCONSUL CALCUTTA  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 02 STATE 041481

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY SANAA  
USINT BAGHDAD  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN  
USLO PEKING  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
USCINCEUR  
DOD/ISA

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS  
FROM DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S PRESS BRIEFING FEBRUARY 24, 1975:

THE SPOKESMAN READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON ARMS POLICY  
TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN: "THE UNITED STATES HAS INFORMED  
THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN THAT IT HAS ENDED  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 041481

TODAY ITS EMBARGO ON THE EXPORT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO  
THOSE COUNTRIES AND PUT INTO EFFECT A POLICY UNDER WHICH WE  
WILL CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR ARMS EXPORTS FOR CASH ON A CASE-  
BY-CASE BASIS. OUR PREVIOUS POLICY PERMITTED ONLY THE  
EXPORT OF NON-LETHAL AND END-ITEMS AND SPARES AND AMMUNITION  
FOR U.S.-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT. IN MAKING THIS MODIFICATION,  
WE ARE BRINGING U.S. POLICY INTO LINE WITH THAT FOLLOWED BY  
OTHER MAJOR WESTERN ARMS SUPPLIERS SUCH AS THE BRITISH AND

FRENCH.

I SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS A CASH ONLY POLICY; WE ARE NOT PLANNING TO PROVIDE ANY EQUIPMENT ON A GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE BASIS OR ON CREDIT. IN WEIGHING ANY INDIVIDUAL EXPORT REQUESTS, WE WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A NUMBER OF FACTORS, INCLUDING THE HIGH IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO CONTINUED PROGRESS TOWARD INDIA-PAKISTAN NORMALIZATION, THE EFFECT OF ANY PARTICULAR SALE ON THE OUTLOOK FOR REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. SALES AND THOSE OF OTHER EXTERNAL ARMS SUPPLIERS, AND OF COURSE THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE REQUEST TO LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AND THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS IN THE REGION.

OUR OVERALL POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA REMAINS EXACTLY AS SECRETARY KISSINGER STATED ON HIS TRIP TO THE REGION LAST FALL: WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN UPSETTING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE SUBCONTINENT OR RESUMING OUR PRE-1965 ROLE AS A MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIER TO THE REGION. WE DO NOT INTEND TO STIMULATE AN ARMS RACE. WE ATTACH THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO CONTINUED RECONCILIATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE THAT PROCESS. WE PRESENTLY ENJOY VERY GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN AND WE SEE NO REASON WHY THIS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE."

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON CONDUCTED THE FOLLOWING QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION:

Q. ROY, THAT LAST STATEMENT ABOUT THE REITERATION OF THE SECRETARY'S POSITION AS OF LAST FALL -- SPECIFICALLY WE DON'T INTEND TO BE A MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIER: DOES THIS MEAN THAT WE ANTICIPATE VERY LIMITED SALES TO PAKISTAN?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 041481

A. THIS IS INTENDED TO MAKE CLEAR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR ARMS SALES POLICY BEFORE 1965, WHEN WE WERE THE MAJOR SUPPLIER TO PAKISTAN, AND ON A VERY LARGE SCALE, AND OUR APPROACH IN THE CURRENT PERIOD.

A. I WOULD NOT WANT TO TRY TO CHARACTERIZE BY ANY PARTICULAR ADJECTIVES HOW WE ARE GOING TO BE IMPLEMENTING THE POLICY, BUT I WOULD SAY, I THINK VERY CLEARLY, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE AN OPEN-ENDED POLICY.

Q. IS IT NOT IMPLICIT IN THIS STATEMENT THAT YOU FEEL THAT THE ARMS BALANCE ON THE SUBCONTINENT IS NOW BEING JEOPARDIZED, AND THAT THEREFORE THERE IS SOME NECESSITY TO LEVEL THINGS OUT A LITTLE BY SELLING AMERICAN ARMS TO

PAKISTAN?

A. I THINK WHAT THE STATEMENT SAYS IS PRETTY SELF-EVIDENT, BUT BASICALLY WE ARE FACED WITH WHAT HAS BECOME AN INCREASINGLY ANOMALOUS SITUATION. IN THE CONTEXT WHERE THE ENTIRE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION ON THE SUBCONTINENT HAS CHANGED VERY FUNDAMENTALLY FROM WHAT IT WAS WHEN THIS ARMS EMBARGO WAS ORIGINALLY IMPOSED TEN YEARS AGO, WE ARE IN A SITUATION WHERE WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE TWO PRINCIPAL POWERS OF THE SUBCONTINENT.

OTHER COUNTRIES -- ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT THE UNITED STATES-- WHO ARE SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET ARE SELLING, OR PROVIDING, TO BOTH COUNTRIES. WE ARE THE ONLY ONE THAT IS NOT. WE RECOGNIZE THE NEED OF EACH OF THESE COUNTRIES -- AND IN THIS CASE PAKISTAN IN PARTICULAR WITH WHOM WE HAVE VERY SPECIAL AND CLOSE RELATIONS -- TO HAVE ACCESS TO WHAT IT FEELS IT NEEDS TO MODERNIZE AND TO KEEP ITS ARMS FORCES CURRENT.

I WOULD NOT WANT TO DRAW A PRECISE BALANCE ON WHETHER THERE IS A BALANCE OR AN IMBALANCE AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT SIMPLY TO SAY THAT WE FEEL THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE ABILITY OF OUR FRIENDS TO FEEL THAT THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO TAKE CARE OF THEIR OWN SECURITY, THAT THIS STEP IS ONE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 041481

THAT SEEMS TO US VERY LOGICAL AND DESIRABLE.

Q. IF I MAY FOLLOW UP, THE THRUST OF MY QUESTION IS THIS:

IF IT WERE IN A STATE OF BALANCE RIGHT NOW, THEN CLEARLY, SENDING AMERICAN ARMS BY SALE OR ANY OTHER MEANS WOULD UPSET THE BALANCE.

SO IS IT NOT LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT THEY ARE OUT OF BALANCE AND INDEED, IT'S A MATTER OF RECORD THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS GREATLY INCREASED ITS ARMS SALES TO THE INDIANS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS?

A. I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN "BALANCE" AND "PARITY."

WE ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A SITUATION OF PARITY OR EQUALITY BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. WE ARE ATTEMPTING SIMPLY TO MAKE AVAILABLE WHAT PAKISTAN FEELS ITS NEEDS ARE, AND WHAT WE JUDGE -- ON THE BASIS OF THESE VARIOUS CRITERIA WHICH THE STATEMENT CITES -- WHAT IT COULD OBTAIN FROM US.

OW I THINK ONE MORE POINT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE: BALANCE IS NOT A STATIC CONCEPT, AND IT'S NOT A MATHEMATICALLY PRECISE CONCEPT. ONE HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT A GREAT MANY FACTORS, ALL OF WHICH WE HAVE CITED HERE AND WE WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT.

Q. IF I MAY ASK, ON ANOTHER MATTER, WITH REFERENCE TO THIS, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INDICATIONS THAT YOU CONSIDER THESE ARMS PRIMARILY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AS FAR AS PAKISTAN IS CONCERNED. WITH THE TURKISH CONTROVERSY OVER CYPRUS AS A PRECEDENT HERE, AND THE RECENT PROBLEMS THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN HAVING, WHAT SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS ARE THERE ON THE USE OF THESE ARMS FOR ANY OTHER THAN WHAT YOU CONSIDER DEFENSIVE PURPOSES?

A. WELL, THERE ARE TWO SEPARATE QUESTIONS, I THINK. FIRST, AS TO THE TYPE OF ARMS, I SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE NOT FACED WITH ANY SPECIFIC REQUEST. UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 041481

WE ARE SIMPLY CREATING A POLICY CONTEXT IN WHICH WE CAN DEAL WITH REQUESTS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

THE PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN, WHEN HE WAS HERE, INDICATED THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE PRIMARILY, AT LEAST, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, IN DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, AND THAT SORT OF THING. WE WILL HAVE TO SEE, AS THE REQUESTS COME, HOW WE WILL DEAL WITH THEM IN THE LIGHT OF THESE VARIOUS CRITERIA WE HAVE ESTABLISHED.

THE SECOND QUESTION OF HOW THESE ARMS MAY OR MAY NOT BE USED, I THINK, IS SPELLED OUT IN THE BASIC AGREEMENTS THAT WE HAVE WITH COUNTRIES TO WHOM WE PROVIDE ARMS. I WOULD HAVE TO, I THINK, GET YOU THE LEGAL PHRASEOLOGY. I DON'T HAVE IT IN MY HEAD. BUT BASICALLY, THE USUAL CRITERIA ARE FOR SELF-DEFENSE AND FOR PURPOSES THAT ARE IN KEEPING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

Q. IS THERE A LIMITATION ON THE USE OF THESE ARMS IN KASHMIR OR IN ANY OTHER SPECIAL CATEGORY?

A. I THINK THE LIMITATIONS ARE THOSE SPELLED OUT IN GENERAL TERMS IN OUR LEGISLATION AND IN THE AGREEMENTS WITH THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. I COULD NOT GIVE YOU AN INTERPRETATION OF THAT IN ANY HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION. I THINK YOU WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT IT IN THE LIGHT OF ANY PARTICULAR SITUATION THAT AROSE.

Q. ANOTHER RELATED QUESTION: THERE HAS BEEN A PUBLISHED

REPORT THAT PAKISTAN IN THESE DISCUSSIONS OFFERED THE UNITED STATES A NAVAL BASE ON THE COAST OF BALUCHISTAN PROVINCE. CAN YOU TELL US WHAT THE STATUS OF THAT SITUATION IS?

A. I HAVE SEEN THE REPORTS, AND I CAN TELL YOU QUITE CATEGORICALLY THE SUBJECT OF A BASE IN PAKISTAN DID NOT COME UP IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO, AND THERE HAS BEEN NO SUCH REQUEST AND NO SUCH AGREEMENT DISCUSSED OR CONCLUDED.

Q. WHEN YOU SPOKE OF THE CONTEXT IN THE SUBCONTINENT BEING UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 041481

SUCH AS TO HAVE SHOWN THAT -- I THINK YOU SAID "CRITICAL CHANGE IN THE BALANCE," WHAT WERE YOU REFERRING TO? WAR IN '71? THE EXPLOSION OF THE PEACEFUL DEVICE OR SOMETHING ELSE?

A. I DON'T BELIEVE I USED THE PHRASE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A "CRITICAL CHANGE IN THE BALANCE." WHAT I MEANT TO SAY WAS THAT THE EMBARGO WAS PUT INTO EFFECT IN 1965 AT THE TIME OF A WAR BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. IT HAS BEEN MAINTAINED THROUGH THE ENTIRE PERIOD, WITH SOME RELAXATIONS WHICH ARE SPELLED OUT, I THINK, IN THE PACKAGE THAT HAS BEEN HANDED OUT TO YOU, IN A ONE-TIME EXCEPTION. IT HAS BEEN MAINTAINED THROUGH THE 1971 INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR.

NOW, QUITE CLEARLY THE OUTCOME OF THAT WAR HAS CHANGED THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE SUBCONTINENT IN WAYS THAT ARE APPARENT TO EVERYBODY. AND THAT IS ALL THAT I HAD IN MIND. I WAS NOT TRYING TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ON THE STATE -- IN ANY PRECISE MATHEMATICAL SENSE -- OF THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP EXCEPT TO NOTE THAT WITHOUT ANY DOUBT INDIA IS THE LARGER, MANY TIMES THE LARGER, OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND HAS MUCH LARGER ARMED FORCES, BOTH IN TERMS OF MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT. AND WHEN I SAID WE ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A SITUATION OF PARITY, I HAD PRECISELY THAT IN MIND.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS THIS DIFFERENCE IN FUNDAMENTAL SIZE AND STRENGTH AND RESOURCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND OUR POLICY IS GOING TO BE CARRIED OUT WITH THAT RECOGNITION IN MIND.

Q. WHY DID YOU STIPULATE CASH ONLY IN THIS ARRANGEMENT, WITH ALL THE MASSIVE AID PROGRAMS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS GOING AT THE PRESENT TIME?

A. OUR BASIC FEELING IS THAT WE ARE COGNIZANT OF THE FEEL-

ING IN CONGRESS, FOR ONE THING, THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME ATTEMPT TO NOT EXPAND FURTHER THE MILITARY SUPPLIES ON A GRANT OR CREDIT BASIS. IN FACT, THIS IS BASICALLY WHAT PAKISTAN HAS INDICATED THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN -- CASH SALES. THE QUESTION OF GRANT OR CREDIT SALES SIMPLY UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 041481

HAS NOT COME UP IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF THIS, OR IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PAKISTANIS.

Q. A RELATED QUESTION. CASH SALES WOULD INCLUDE PAYMENT IN RUPEES OR IN DOLLARS ONLY?

A. PAYMENT IN DOLLARS.

Q. THIS DOESN'T RULE OUT DISCOUNT SALES, DOES IT, OF EQUIPMENT THAT THE PENTAGON DECIDES IS NOT THE MOST MODERN?

A. I DON'T HAVE THE ANSWER TO THAT. IT WILL DEPEND ON THE NEGOTIATION OF EACH SPECIFIC TRANSACTION AS IT CAME UP.

Q. IF I COULD JUST FOLLOW THAT UP AND POSE ANOTHER ONE? IS THAT WHY YOU THINK THAT IT WILL NOT REACH A PROPORTION OF PRE-'65 BECAUSE THEY DON'T HAVE THE CASH TO PAY FOR IT?

A. I THINK THAT IS ONE LIMITING FACTOR, BUT I THINK ALSO OUR GENERAL INTENT IS NOT TO TRY TO CREATE THE KIND OF PARITY BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN WHICH WAS THE STATED GOAL OF POLICY IN THE PRE-1965 PERIOD.

Q. AND ANOTHER ONE. YOU SAY YOU HAVE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN. WHAT HAS BEEN THE REACTION FROM THE INDIANS?

A. WELL, I WOULD RATHER, I THINK, LET THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT SPEAK FOR ITSELF ON THIS. I UNDERSTAND THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY LATER IN THE DAY.

Q. TO FOLLOW UP JUST ONE PART OF IT, HAS INDIA SHOWN ANY SIGN OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF LIFTING THE EMBARGO FOR PURCHASES OF ITS OWN?

A. PURCHASES FROM US?

Q. FROM US.

A. WELL, LIFTING THE EMBARGO IS GENERAL. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS A LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON SALES TO BOTH INDIA AND UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 041481

PAKISTAN, AND WE WOULD OF COURSE ENTERTAIN REQUESTS FROM INDIA AS FROM PAKISTAN, APPLYING THE SAME GENERAL CRITERIA.

Q. BUT WE KNOW THAT PAKISTAN IS INTERESTED. IS INDIA ALSO INTERESTED?

A. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY RECENT EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST, NO.

Q. WHY DID YOU HOLD UP AMBASSADOR SAXBE?

A. WE WERE IN CONSULTATION WITH AMBASSADOR SAXBE, AS HE PROCEEDED TOWARDS NEW DELHI, TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE RELATIONSHIP OF HIS ARRIVAL AND HIS PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS TO THIS ANNOUNCEMENT; AND WE FELT SINCE IT TURNED OUT, NOT BY PLANNING BUT BY COINCIDENCE, THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE PRESENTING CREDENTIALS ON THE DAY THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS BEING MADE, THAT IT WOULD PERHAPS BE PREFERABLE IF HE DELAYED HIS ARRIVAL A FEW DAYS.

Q. WHEN IS HE GOING TO GET IN?

A. I HAVE NOT SEEN HIS FINAL DECISION ON AN ARRIVAL DATE, BUT HE SPOKE IN TERMS OF A FEW DAYS. I WOULD GUESS WITHIN A WEEK.

Q. WHY IS PAKISTAN NOT ENTITLED TO PARITY SO FAR AS SUCH A THING CAN BE ACHIEVED, VIS-AVIS INDIA? IS IT BECAUSE OF OUR SENSIBILITIES TOWARDS INDIA?

A. LET ME TRY TO RE-EMPHASIZE WHAT OUR OVERRIDING CRITERIA ARE IN IMPLEMENTING THIS POLICY. I CAN'T STRESS TOO OFTEN AND TOO STRONGLY THAT OUR OVERRIDING POLICY CONCERN IN SOUTH ASIA TODAY IS THAT THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION AND OF RECONCILIATION THAT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS BE CONTINUED. WE DO NOT WANT TO IMPLEMENT THIS POLICY IN A WAY WHICH WILL FUEL AN ARMS RACE, THAT WILL CREATE A SENSE OF INSECURITY ON EITHER SIDE TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY FEEL THAT THE BALANCE IS IN ANY WAY UPSET.

THEREFORE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT TO TRY TO ESTABLISH PARITY,  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 10 STATE 041481

WHEN THE BASIC SIZES OF THE COUNTRIES ARE AS DISPARATE AS THEY ARE, WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS COMPLEX OF CONSIDERATIONS AND CRITERIA.



Q. YOUR CHART ON PAGE 3 JUST CARRIES IT UP TO 1973. DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT THE CURRENT RATE OF ARMS PURCHASES BY INDIA FROM THE SOVIET UNION IS?

A. IN 1974?

Q. YES. SINCE '73.

A. NO, I DON'T HAVE. IF WE DO HAVE ANYTHING WE CAN MAKE AVAILABLE, WE WILL DO THAT. BUT I DON'T HAVE IT HERE, AND I DON'T HAVE IT IN MY HEAD.

Q. THERE WAS TO HAVE BEEN A MEETING OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HERE IN MID-MARCH AS PART OF THE NEW JOINT U.S.-INDIA COMMISSION. WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THAT MEETING? IS IT STILL SCHEDULED, OR HAS IT BEEN POSTPONED?

A. THE MEETING, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, IS STILL SCHEDULED. WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING TO THE CONTRARY FROM THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

Q. WILL DR. KISSINGER ATTEND THE MEETING?

A. DR. KISSINGER WOULD BE PRESENT IF HE WERE IN THE COUNTRY. AS YOU KNOW, HE IS PLANNING A TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND OBVIOUSLY ONE HAS TO SEE HOW THAT WORKS OUT IN TERMS OF TIME. BUT IT CERTAINLY IS HIS DESIRE AND INTENTION TO BE PRESENT.

Q. HAS THE SECRETARY BEEN IN TOUCH DIRECTLY WITH INDIAN LEADERS, OUTSIDE OF THE AMBASSADOR HERE, ABOUT THIS RESUMPTION?

A. WELL, WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT IN NEW DELHI. THE SECRETARY HIMSELF HAS NOT, BUT OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE A DIALOGUE THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN NEW DELHI WITH UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 11 STATE 041481

THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

Q. THERE HANST BEEN ANY DIRECT EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY?

A. AS YOU KNOW, THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD SENT A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY AT THE END OF JANUARY. LET ME, IF I COULD, ON THIS ONE POINT, GO ON BACKGROUND. THE SECRETARY HAS RESPONDED TO THAT LETTER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSION WITH THE INDIAN

GOVERNMENT OF THIS CHANGE OF POLICY, AND I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE HAVE HAD A FULL CONSULTATION AND DISCUSSION WITH THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY.

Q. WHEN WAS THE SECRETARY'S RESPONSE?

A. IT WAS TOWARDS THE END OF LAST WEEK WHEN THE REPLY WENT, BUT I HAVEN'T GOT THE PRECISE DATE ON THAT.

Q. CAN YOU BE A BIT SPECIFIC ON THE MATTER OF -- I RECOGNIZE THE POLICY HERE DECLARED TO BE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS -- BUT WITH THE ABSENCE OF ANY MAGNITUDE THIS IS REALLY THROWN UP IN THE AIR AS TO WHETHER THE UNITED STATES IS TALKING ABOUT TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OR HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF SALES.

TWO QUESTIONS ON THAT. HAVE THERE BEEN EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS? AND IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH CONGRESS HAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT INDICATED SOME MAGNITUDE?

A. NO, WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC MAGNITUDES IN MIND, BEYOND WHAT I'VE SAID EARLIER THAT WE DO NOT ENVISAGE THIS AS AN OPEN-ENDED SALES POLICY. BUT UNTIL WE HAVE SPECIFIC REQUESTS TO CONSIDER IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO BE MORE PRECISE ON MAGNITUDE.

Q. HAVE WE HAD CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS ON THIS?

A. WE HAVE HAD VERY FULL CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS BUT, AGAIN, IN THE GENERAL TERMS IN WHICH I AM NOW DISCUSSING IT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 12 STATE 041481

BECAUSE, AS I SAY, UNTIL WE HAVE REQUESTS IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO BE PRECISE ON MAGNITUDE.

Q. SINCE PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO WAS HERE WITH SOME REQUESTS EARLIER THIS MONTH, HOW LONG DO YOU ANTICIPATE IT WILL BE BEFORE YOU ACTUALLY ACT ON THESE REQUESTS?

A. WE HAVE NOT HAD FORMAL SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR SPECIFIC SALES. WE ARE AWARE OF THE GENERAL AREAS IN WHICH PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO INDICATED AN INTEREST, AND I WOULD ASSUME THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL BE FOLLOWING UP TO MAKE THESE MORE PRECISE. BUT AT THIS POINT WE ARE NOT SEIZED WITH ANY FORMAL SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF SPECIFIC ITEMS.

Q. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER WAS HERE HE TOLD THE PRESS, AND HE SAID IT EARLIER IN 'PINDI, THAT IF HIS CONVENTIONAL

ARMS REQUIREMENTS WERE MET HE WOULD NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO SEEK NUCLEAR PARITY WITH INDIA. DO YOU HAVE ANY UNDERSTANDING WITH PAKISTAN ABOUT ACCEPTING INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS ON WHATEVER FUTURE REACTORS THEY MIGHT GET?

A. LET ME MAKE TWO POINTS ON THAT. FIRST, OBVIOUSLY, THE WHOLE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS ONE IN WHICH WE ARE CONTINUALLY INTERESTED AND CONCERNED. AND IT WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN HE WAS HERE. HE HAS STATED THAT, AS YOU HAVE QUOTED HIM AS SAYING, PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE THE INTENTION OF DEVELOPING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IF IT IS ABLE TO ASSURE ITS SECURITY BY CONVENTIONAL MEANS. HE HAS SAID THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES PAKISTAN WOULD CONSIDER PLACING ITS NUCLEAR FACILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS, AND THAT BASICALLY IT DOES NOT WANT TO DIVERT RESOURCES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. SO OBVIOUSLY WE DID HAVE AN EXCHANGE ON THIS.

THE IMPLICATION THAT THERE IS A LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWO I WOULD WANT TO CORRECT.

Q. IN WHAT WAY?

A. WELL, I READ THE IMPLICATION INTO BERNIE'S QUESTION  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 13 STATE 041481

THAT SOMEHOW THE EXPRESSIONS OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY WERE IN SOME WAY LINKED TO THE DECISION ON THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO; AND I JUST WANT TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THESE ARE TWO SEPARATE DEVELOPMENTS, IN PARALLEL BUT SEPARATE.

Q. BUT YOU'RE SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD APPRECIATE PAKISTAN'S REFRAINING FROM DEVELOPING THESE?

A. THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR GLOBAL POLICY.

Q. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU HAVE NO COMMITMENT FROM PAKISTAN?

A. NO, THERE IS NOT WHAT I WOULD CALL A FORMAL COMMITMENT.

Q. INFORMAL?

A. NO. THIS IS SIMPLY A POLICY POSITION OF PAKISTAN WHICH WE WELCOME AND HOPE AND ANTICIPATE WILL BE THE POLICY OF PAKISTAN.  
NOLLOWING ARE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN AND THE NEWSMEN:

Q. CONGRESSMAN HENRY WAXMAN FROM CALIFORNIA, HAS SENT A

LETTER TO DR. KISSINGER COMPLAINING ABOUT SAUDI POLICY REGARDING JEWISH TOURISTS VISITING SAUDI ARABIA. AND HE SAYS THAT HE WAS DENIED ENTRY VISA WHEN HE FIRST APPLIED TO GO WITH THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE LAST WEEK, AND HE WAS ONLY GRANTED A VISA AFTER THE STATE DEPARTMENT INTERVENED ON HIS BEHALF AND AMBASSADOR AKINS IN RIYADH FINALLY CONVINCED THE SAUDIS TO GRANT HIM A VISA.

I HAVE SEVERAL QUESTIONS ON HIS LETTER, BUT THE FIRST QUESTION IS DO YOU KNOW WHETHER, IN FACT, THAT IS TRUE? DID THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT HELP GET CONGRESSMAN WAXMAN A VISA?

A. LET ME MAKE TWO OR THREE POINTS ON THIS, BECAUSE, AS YOU MENTIONED, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE CONGRESSMAN IS WRITING TO THE SECRETARY ON THIS WHOLE SUBJECT. I WANT TO WITHHOLD ANY DETAILED COMMENTS UNTIL WE HAVE RECEIVED THE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 14 STATE 041481

LETTER, OBVIOUSLY, AND HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO ANSWER IT. BUT WE UNDERSTAND, AS YOU JUST OUTLINED, THAT REPRESENTATIVE WAXMAN DID HAVE A PROBLEM IN OBTAINING A SAUDI VISA. AND HE JOINED THE HOUSE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE DELEGATION GOING TO SAUDI ARABIA 48 HOURS BEFORE THE GROUP LEFT THE UNITED STATES AND WAS NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN A VISA WHEN HE FIRST APPLIED. HOWEVER, WITH OUR ASSISTANCE HERE, ARRANGEMENTS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY MADE FOR HIM TO ENTER SAUDI ARABIA ALONG WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THEIR ARRIVAL.

Q. WHAT WAS THE PROBLEM? YOU SAID HE HAD A PROBLEM. ON WHAT? BECAUSE OF HIS RELIGION?

A. I DO NOT KNOW. THE SAUDI ARABIANS WOULD NOT GIVE HIM A VISA IN THE BEGINNING. THIS HAS BEEN SOMETHING THAT HAS GONE ON BEFORE. BUT THROUGH AMBASSADOR AKINS, WE WERE ABLE TO GET IT.

Q. YOU DON'T KNOW THE NATURE OF HIS PROBLEM?

A. I WANT TO SEE THE LETTER FIRST TO SEE EVERYTHING THAT WENT ON HERE. ALL I CAN TELL YOU AT THIS STAGE IS HE DID HAVE A PROBLEM, AND WE SOLVED THE PROBLEM, AND HE WAS ABLE TO GET IN WITH THE COMMITTEE.

Q. WELL, THE POINT IS IF YOU HELPED HIM, AS YOU SAY YOU DID, OVERCOME A PROBLEM, IT WOULD SEEM TO BE LOGICAL YOU WOULD KNOW WHAT THE PROBLEM IS IF YOU HELPED HIM.

A. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT HE DIDN'T HAVE A VISA.

Q. I REALIZE THAT. WAS IT BAD PENMANSHIP, OR DID IT GO TO SOMETHING ELSE?

A. WELL, LET'S WAIT UNTIL WE GET THE LETTER.

Q. I'M WILLING TO WAIT MONTHS. BUT IF YOU WANT TO TAKE CREDIT FOR HELPING AND FOR APPRECIATING HIS PROBLEM, YOU KNOW, IT WOULD BE GOOD IF YOU KNEW WHAT HIS PROBLEM WAS. YOU DON'T KNOW HIS PROBLEM?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 15 STATE 041481

A. I JUST DON'T WANT TO CARRY IT ANY FURTHER THAN WE HAVE GOT IT HERE AT THE MOMENT.

Q. HE SAYS HE WAS TOLD IN SAUDI ARABIA THERE ARE NO AMERICAN JEWISH FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS OR ANY JEWISH MILITARY PERSONNEL OR JEWISH BUSINESS MEN THAT ARE ALLOWED TO WORK IN SAUDI ARABIA. AND HE SAYS THAT HE WAS TOLD THAT OUR GOVERNMENT -- QUOTE -- "HAS CHOSEN NOT TO PRESS THE ISSUE." HE ALSO SAYS, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF NONDISCRIMINATORY POLICY IN STAFFING THE EMBASSY IN SOUTH AFRICA BY ALLOWING BLACK FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS TO WORK THERE. "APPARENTLY" HE SAYS -- QUOTE -- "THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT APPLIED THE SAME KIND OF POLICY IN SAUDI ARABIA." IS THAT TRUE?

A. NO, IT ISN'T.

WITH REGARD TO RACE OR RELIGION, SEX, CREED, WHATEVER YOU WANT TO CALL THESE VARIOUS THINGS, THE NATIONAL ORIGIN OF A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, WE DON'T EVEN KNOW THE RELIGIONS OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS. IT'S NOT IN THE FILES HERE. AND OUR POLICY OF ASSIGNING OFFICERS IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE REGARDLESS OF THESE VARIOUS POINTS THAT I JUST MADE IS TO TRY AND GET THE RIGHT PERSON IN THE RIGHT JOB AT THE RIGHT TIME. THAT IS WHAT OUR POLICY IS.

Q. ARE THERE, IN FACT, ANY FOREIGN SERVICE, AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS SERVING IN SAUDI ARABIA?

A. I DON'T KNOW, BECAUSE IN OUR FILES WE DON'T HAVE ANY RELIGIOUS CLASSIFICATION INDICATION IN THE FILE.

Q. WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS IF, IN EFFECT, THERE ARE NOT ANY JEWISH FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS THEN THAT WOULD BE A COINCIDENCE, IS THAT CORRECT?

A. POSSIBLY, YES.

Q. AT WHAT POINT DID THE DEPARTMENT STOP ASKING FOR  
RELIGION ON ITS APPLICATION FORMS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE  
OFFICERS?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 16 STATE 041481

A. I THINK IT WAS ABOUT THREE OR FOUR YEARS AGO. JANUARY  
'72, IT SAYS HERE ON THE CIRCULAR.

Q. JUST FOR THE RECORD HERE, WHEN A PERSON APPLIES FOR A  
VISA TO SAUDI ARABIA, I PRESUME THIS WOULD INCLUDE A DIP-  
LOMATIC VISA, YOU HAVE TO FILL OUT THE SAUDI ARABIAN VISA  
FORM, WHICH DOES INCLUDE A REFERENCE, AS I RECALL, TO ONE'S  
RELIGION AND NATIONALITY. ARE STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS  
DIRECTED NOT TO FILL THAT OUT?

A. LET ME CHECK. THAT PARTICULAR POINT I DON'T HAVE IN  
MY GUIDANCE. I WOULD ASSUME FROM THE GUIDANCE I RECEIVED  
THE ANSWER MAY BE NO TO THAT, BUT I WOULD WANT TO CHECK  
IT BECAUSE IT'S A GOOD POINT.

Q. WELL, ONE THING THAT SHOULD BE ON THE RECORD IS  
WHETHER ANY OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN  
TO SAUDI ARABIA OVER THE LAST TWENTY YEARS OR SO, ANY OF  
THE MILITARY TRAINING GROUPS WHO HAVE BEEN THERE OVER THE  
SAME PERIOD OF TIME, ANY OF THE CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS  
THROUGH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE BEEN THERE  
OVER THE SAME AMOUNT OF TIME, WHICH MUST BE WELL OVER A  
THOUSAND, HAVE EVER BEEN TURNED DOWN.

A. I AGREE WITH YOU. LET ME SEE IF I CAN FIND OUT IF ANY-  
BODY HAS BEEN TURNED DOWN FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER.

Q. DO YOU MEAN THAT UNDER EXISTING RULES IT IS POSSIBLE,  
JUST BY CHANCE, THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT END UP WITH  
ALL JEWISH DIPLOMATS IN SAUDI ARABIA?

A. ON THIS SUBJECT I HAVE STATED FOR YOU WHAT OUR POLICY  
IS WITH REGARD TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE  
OFFICERS, AND I CAN'T GO ANY FURTHER.

Q. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION ON THAT POINT. DO YOU  
KNOW CONGRESSMAN WAXMAN'S RELIGION?

A. NO, I DON'T.

Q. ON THIS QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS KNOWN A GIVEN  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 17 STATE 041481

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER IS JEWISH OR NOT, IT WAS REMARKED IN THIS BUILDING NOT VERY LONG AGO IN THE NEAR EASTERN SECTION THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNEW VERY WELL THAT IT HAD ACQUIRED THE ABILITY TO ASSIGN OFFICERS OF JEWISH ORIGIN OR JEWISH RELIGION TO SEVERAL ARAB POSTS, AND THAT THIS WAS A CHANGE. SO SOMEBODY SEEMS TO KNOW WHO IS JEWISH AROUND HERE.

A. I DON'T.

Q. AND THIS WAS REMARKED UPON AS A CHANGE.

A. I DON'T THINK THAT WHAT YOU HAVE SAID NOW, ALLEGEDLY COMING FROM A NEAR EASTERN OFFICE, CONTRADICTS IN ANY WAY WHAT I HAVE SAID. WE STILL STAND BY THE VERY BASIC IDEA OF TRYING TO ASSIGN THE RIGHT MAN TO THE RIGHT PLACE. AND WHAT YOU SAY DOES NOT CONTRADICT THIS. BUT I CANNOT ANSWER THE SPECIFIC THING THAT YOU ASK.

Q. MAY I ASK ONE QUESTION ABOUT THIS? THE RULES WERE CHANGED, AS I UNDERSTOOD YOU TO SAY, IN JANUARY OF 1972 WHEN THE FOREIGN SERVICE --

A. IT MAY HAVE BEEN BEFORE THAT. MY GUIDANCE SAYS, "IT WAS STATED LAST IN A FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL CIRCULAR IN JANUARY 1972." NOW, MY GUESS IS IT WAS EARLIER THAN THAT, AND I WOULD LIKE TO GET THE DATE FOR IT.

Q. WELL, WHAT I WAS GOING TO ASK IS WHY DID THEY STOP ASKING FOR IT, WHY DID THEY HAVE IT BEFORE, AND WHY DID THEY STOP IT IN '72 OR WHENEVER THE DATE WAS?

A. I DON'T GET YOUR QUESTION.

Q. WHAT'S THE REASON FOR STOPPING ASKING WHAT A PERSON'S RELIGION IS?

A. LET ME JUST PUT IT THIS WAY. IT WAS A WRONG THING TO HAVE DONE BEFORE, AND I THINK IT'S A HIGHLY DESIRABLE THING, AND I'M GLAD WE DID IT, AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT DATE WE STARTED IT, BUT IN MY VIEW WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED IT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 18 STATE 041481

EVEN EARLIER THAN WE DID.

Q. I JUST HAVE ONE MORE QUESTION. WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE ANY WOMEN FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS IN SAUDI ARABIA?

A. I WOULD HAVE TO CHECK IT, FRANKLY. I KNOW THERE ARE  
IN CAIRO. KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** PRESS CONFERENCES  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 FEB 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
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**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ElyME  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 MAY 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23 MAY 2003 by RuthemTJ>; APPROVED <14 JAN 2004 by ElyME>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
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**TAGS:** PFOR, US  
**To:** ISLAMABAD MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006